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Abstract
The winners of auctions for PPP contracts, especially for major in-
frastructure projects such as highways, often enter nancial distress,
requiring the concession to either be re-allocated or re-negotiated. We
build a simple model to identify the causes and consequences of such
problems. In the model, rms bid toll charges for a xed-term high-
way concession, with the lowest bid winning the auction. The winner
builds and operates the highway for the xed concession period. Each
bidder has a privately known construction cost and there is common
uncertainty regarding the level of demand that will result for the com-
pleted highway. Because it is costly for the Government to re-assign
the concession, it is exposed to a hold-up problem, which bidders can
exploit through the strategic use of debt. Each rm chooses its nan-
cial structure to provide optimal insurance against downside demand
risk: the credible threat of default is used to extort an additional
transfer payment from the Government. We derive the optimal nan-
cial structure and equilibrium bidding behaviour and show that (i)
the auction remains e¢ cient, but (ii) bids are lower than they would
be if all bidders were cash nanced, and (iii) the more e¢ cient the
winning rm, the more likely it is to require a Government bail-out
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and the higher the expected transfer it extracts from the Government.
We discuss potential resolutions of this problem, including the use of
Least-Present-Value-of-Revenue (LPVR) auctions.
2
1 Introduction
Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) are increasingly used to provide infrastruc-
ture services and other public goods. Thomsen (2005) reports that worldwide
investment in PPPs in the early 1990s had reached $131 billion whereas the
World Bank PPP database suggests that their total value reached nearly $1.2
trillion dollars globally as of 2006. The popularity of PPPs seems to rest,
at least among development circles, on their perceived ability to shift risks
from the public to the private sector. However, the implications of this shift
in risk are not well understood.
Bracey and Moldovan (2007) point out that about 50 percent of PPPs
never even reach the nancing stage and, of those that do, about 50 percent
are renegotiated during the building or implementation phases. This sug-
gests that the winners of PPP contracts, especially for major infrastructure
projects such as highways, frequently enter nancial distress, requiring the
concession to either be re-allocated or re-negotiated. Very often, these issues
are due to revenue falling short of expectations.
There are many examples of PPPs for the construction and operation of
highways that failed due to lower than expected demand. One such example
is the extension of the M1 Motorway in Hungary. Once the M1 was com-
pleted, it became clear that the project was at risk of default as tra¢ c and
toll revenues were only half the amount forecast by investors, lenders and the
Hungarian government. The nal outcome was the renationalisation of the
project. A successor PPP contract to build the M5 highway from Budapest
to Serbia also ran into trouble once realised demand was lower than expected.
The outcome of renegotiation was the subsidisation of the toll by transfers
from the government to the concessionaire.1 Examples in Australia include
the cross city tunnel in Sydney2 and the Clem 7 tunnel in Brisbane.3
Our main objective in the present paper is to better understand the preva-
lence of bail-outs under such arrangements. In our model, rms bid for a
concession to build and operate a highway4 in a rst-price, sealed-bid auc-
tion.5 Each rm has privately known construction costs, but all face common
1See Bracey and Moldovan (2007).
2See http://www.tollroadsnews.com/node/1742.
3See http://www.theaustralian.com.au/archive/business-old.end-of-the-road-as-
rivercity-motorway-sinks-owing-13bn/story-e6frg9i6-1226011606877
4We assume throughout the paper that construction is bundled with operation in the
tender process. Iossa and Martimort (2008) and Martimort and Pouyet (2008) examine
whether such bundling is optimal and the resulting implications for contract design.
5As Engel, Fischer and Galetovic (2001) point out, highway franchises are typically
auctioned on the basis of a xed term with lowest toll bid winning (or xed toll and lowest
concession length).
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uncertainty about future demand for the highway. Bids take the form of the
toll to be charged and the rm with the lowest bid is granted the concession.
Bidders also decide how to nance the up-front construction costs conditional
on winning the contract.
A key feature of the model is the strategic use of debt-nancing to hold
upthe Government. To be clear, in our model there is no underlying reason
for rms to use debt to nance construction; rms are not cash constrained.
Instead, the only reason why rms might use debt nance is to force the
government to renegotiate. Indeed, we show that in low demand states,
the winning rm threatens bankruptcy. Provided its debt is not too high,
the Government has an incentive to renegotiate and provide a transfer to
the nancially distressed rm, rather than bear the cost of re-allocating the
concession.
Our model suggests that default and re-negotiation are natural outcomes
of PPP auctions. However, this does not result in an ine¢ cient allocation
process. A bidders optimal capital structure depends on its cost type, and
the possibility of renegotiation causes rms to bid more aggressively than
in an unlimited liability setting, but the equilibrium bidding function is still
monotone in the rms cost type. This implies that the auction allocates
the contract to the lowest cost rm, but the bids may appear unrealistically
attractive to a Government which fails to anticipate the subsequent hold-up.
The most surprising result is that (for our demand specication) the
severity of the hold-up problem is increasing in the e¢ ciency of the winning
rm: more e¢ cient rms are bailed out more often and extract a higher
expected transfer from Government than less e¢ cient rms.
We note that there are reasons other than demand uncertainty that can
lead to renegotiation. These include lack of compliance with agreed-upon
terms and departure from expected outcomes (Guasch, 2004), and departure
from contract terms due to the existence of transaction costs, inherent con-
tractual incompleteness, or the imperfect ability of governments to enforce
contracts (Williamson, 1985; Masten and Saussier, 2000; Bajari and Tadelis,
2001; Grossman and Hart, 1986; and Guasch et al., 2006). Guasch et al.
(2007, 2008) examined over 1,000 concession contracts in Latin America and
found that the conditions conducive to renegotiations are a combination of
contract characteristics, regulatory environment and economic shocks.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes a version
of the model in which there are only two possible demand states. This has
the virtue of simplicity, so we can solve explicitly for the equilibrium capital
structure of rms and the equilibrium (symmetric) bidding function, but the
environment is restrictive. In the two-state world, all rms have the same
level of debt, all face the risk-free interest rate, and the likelihood and size
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of any bail-out is independent of the winning rms cost type. None of these
features survive the extension to a continuum of states, which is covered in
Section 3. Section 4 discusses methods for ameliorating the hold-up problem,
including the use of Least-Present-Value-of-Revenue (LPVR) auctions.
1.1 Related literature
We discuss connections with the PPP literature in the nal section, but our
analysis also has precursors in the literature on auctions. It is a descendant
of Spulber (1990), who studied procurement auctions in which the winning
bidder may default on performance if information revealed after the auction
results in cost overruns. Spulber focusses on the potential for bid pooling a
race to the bottomin which ine¢ cient rms bid low in the expectation of
performing only in the most favourable circumstances, forcing more e¢ cient
rms to do likewise.6 He notes that renegotiation may restore e¢ ciency.
In a similar vein, Zheng (2001) sets out to explain the outcomes of FCC
spectrum auctions, in which winning bidders declared bankruptcy and de-
faulted on the payment of their bids. In his model, bidders di¤er in cash
constraints. All face a common interest rate to borrow. If this rate is low
enough, the most cash-constrained bidder wins and therefore defaults with
high probability. Intuitively, if the interest rate is very low (say zero), bidders
with less cash on hand have an advantage, as they have less to lose when
they default. This allows them to out-bid their cashed-up rivals.
In an important extension of Zhengs work, Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan
(2005) allow cash-constrained bidders to nance their bids. When each bid-
der has a private cash constraint but equal access to a competitive nance
market, they prove that allocative ine¢ ciencies continue to arise.
Unlike these models, our bidders are not cash constrained and there is
no e¢ ciency issue in equilibrium. Rather, we focus on the strategic use
of debt to undermine the transfer of risk from the public to the private
partner. Our model is also tailored to incorporate typical features of highway
concession auctions: there is a long-run post-auction relationship between the
seller (Government) and the winning bidder, construction takes place before
revenue is earned, and bids are toll rates for the completed highway.
Finally, the strategic choice of debt in our model parallels that of a regu-
lated rm in Spiegel and Spulber (1994, 1997). There, a regulated rm takes
on debt so that the regulator sets a higher regulated price to reduce the like-
lihood of default. As in our model, these authors assume that the regulator
(Government) bears an exogenous (unmodelled) cost of default. However, in
6See also Board (2007), who studies a common value environment in which bidders
receive private signals about value.
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our model, the rm chooses both debt and price, and in equilibrium these
choice are made to increase the probability of insolvency (absent a bail-out),
not decrease it. We also endogenise the cost of debt, whereas this cost is
exogenous in Spiegel and Spulber.
2 A two-state model
2.1 Set-up
We consider a rst-price, sealed-bid auction for a highway concession of
xed duration. Bidders have heterogeneous and privately known construc-
tion costs, though all are assumed to be able to complete the construction
within the same timeframe. For simplicity, we assume that rms have com-
mon (zero) operating costs once the road is built. Each rm bids the toll it
will charge for use of the road while it holds the concession. The lowest bid
wins, with ties resolved using uniform randomisation. The winner builds the
road then operates it for the specied xed period, charging the toll it bid
at the auction. For technical convenience, we ignore discounting; that is, the
interest rate on risk-free debt is zero.
Toll revenue is uncertain at the time of bidding. More specically, demand
for the completed road will be q =    p for some  2 fL; Hg, with
0 < L < H  2L.
(The restriction H  2L ensures that rms will never charge a price which
exceeds the choke price in state L.) Let  2 (0; 1) be the probability of
H , such that expected toll revenue is p
 
   p, where  = H + (1  ) L.
Bidders are risk-neutral.
Given the absence of discounting, we model the situation as three discrete
stages: the auction stage, the construction stage, and the operation stage 
the entire post-construction concession is collapsed into a single period. The
value of  is realised at the start of the third stage. Firms decide whether
or not to default on their obligations to creditors after observing . We
assume that all revenue generated in the third stage (i.e., over the life of the
concession) is available to creditors in the event of default.7
7In practice, an insolvent rm will default early in the concession so creditors may
not have access to all future revenue streams bankruptcy costs may reduce the residual
value of the concession below the present value of the revenue stream. This will a¤ect the
optimal capital structure of rms, since debt will be more expensive than equity nancing.
Firms who do not face cash constraints will only borrow for strategic reasons. We plan to
explore the consequences of this alternative bankruptcy assumption and cash constraints
in future work.
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Firm i has construction cost ci, drawn randomly (and independently of
other rmscosts) according to the common distribution F , dened on the
support [c; c], where
0  c < c <


2
2
.
We assume that F is strictly increasing and di¤erentiable, with associated
density f . Note that
 
=2
2
is the ex ante expected revenue of a monopolist.
A critical component of our model is the nancing of construction costs.
These costs are incurred prior to revenue being earned and must be nanced
by the concessionaire. This privatisation of nance is a standard feature of
PPP arrangements. As a benchmark, we rst analyse the model under the
assumption that the rm funds all construction costs using cash/equity (i.e.,
is exposed to unlimited liability for losses on the project). Following that we
consider a more realistic scenario in which the rm may choose a mixture of
debt and equity nancing, and the cost of funds is endogenously determined.
2.2 Cash nancing (unlimited liability)
Suppose there exists a symmetric and di¤erentiable bidding strategy p (ci),
with p0 > 0 so that the rm with the lowest construction cost wins the
auction. Since p is di¤erentiable and type c expects to cover its costs at the
monopoly price, we must also have
p (c)  
2
for all c 2 [c; c]. To see this, notice that a rm that bids above =2 could
strictly increase both its probability of winning and its expected revenue
conditional on winning by bidding =2 instead. The latter bid would also
guarantee a strictly positive payo¤.
If the equilibrium bidding strategy is e¢ cient, then ci solves:
max
c

p (c)
 
   p (c)  ci (1  F )n 1 (c)
Dening b
 
c; 

= p (c)
 
   p (c) and F (c) = 1  F (c) this becomes
max
c

b
 
c; 
  ciF n 1 (c)
Since p (c)  =2 for all c, b () is strictly increasing in c. By standard
arguments (see, for example, Menezes and Monteiro, 2004, Chapter 3, for
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the case of rst-price auctions) b
 
c; 

= c and for any c < c,
b
 
c; 

=  
Z c
c
z
dF
n 1
(z)
F
n 1
(c)
.
Recall that the highest type, c, can cover its costs at the monopoly price, so
all rm types are willing to participate in the auction.
Let X denote the random variable corresponding to the lowest of n   1
random draws from F . Then
H (z) = Pr [X  z] = 1  F n 1 (z)
is the distribution function for X and we may write
b
 
c; 

=
Z c
c
z
dH (z)
[1 H (c)] = E [X j X > c] .
Thus, the winning rms surplus is the di¤erence between its own cost and
the expected value of the next lowest cost; a common result in the literature
on rst-price auctions.
It is obvious that the function b
 
c; 

is strictly increasing in c. Since
bc
 
c; 

=
 
   2p (c) p0 (c) ,
it follows that p0 (c) has the same sign as bc
 
c; 

, so p is also strictly increas-
ing in c as was assumed.
To nd an explicit expression for p (c), we let  (c) = E [X j X > c] and
solve
p (c)
 
   p (c) =  (c) .
Taking the smaller root, we have
p (c) =

2
 
s

2
2
   (c).
Figure 1 illustrates.
Note that the two-state assumption plays no role in the construction of
this benchmark equilibrium. Only the expected value  appears in the calcu-
lations. The same results would be obtained for any assumption about the
distribution of . In particular, Figure 1 continues to describe the unlimited
liabilitybenchmark for the model with a continuum of states analysed in
Section 3.8
8Hansen (1988) also solves a bidding model in which rms bid prices at which they will
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Figure 1: Equilibrium with cash nancing
2.3 Endogenous nancing and strategic default
Consider a rm i that uses both cash (equity) Ki and debt Di = ci  Ki to
fund the construction phase. We assume that rms face no cash constraint, so
each can choose any level of Ki, and all have access to the same competitive
market for debt. This implies that rms are distinguishable only by their
construction costs.
Since rms face no cash constraint, they will hold debt only for strategic
reasons in our model. Note that we do not allow rms to take on more debt
than is necessary to nance their construction costs.
Assume that there is a symmetric equilibrium bidding strategy ~p (ci) and
dene
~b (c; ) = ~p (c) (   ~p (c)) .
We assume that ~b (c; H)  c for all c 2 [c; c] to ensure the winning rm is
always solvent in the high demand state. However, we allow for the possibility
that toll revenue may not cover construction costs when demand is low.
supply goods to a market. In Hansens set-up, rms all have zero xed costs but positive
and heterogeneous marginal costs, while our rms have positive and heterogeneous xed
costs (i.e., the costs of construction) but all have zero marginal costs (i.e., zero maintenance
costs). As Hansens analysis indicates, our assumption of zero marginal costs greatly
simplies the derivation of the equilibrium bids.
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We further assume that nancing is not revealed as part of the tender
process: for example, the winning rm might nalise its nance only after the
auction.9 This assumption is necessary to ensure that costs remain private
information, since costs may be inferred from Di.
If rm i wins the auction and Di > 0, it may choose to default if realised
revenue is too low. Let us suppose that the winning bidder is always solvent
in the high-demand state (H). If rm i borrows at the risk-free rate (zero),
it is insolvent in the low demand state if ~b (ci; L) < Di.10 In the absence of
a Government bail-out, an insolvent rm will default and make a loss equal
to
  (ci  Di) .
In the event of default, the Government re-assigns the concession and
pays the original creditors ~b (ci; L) from the proceeds of the sale that is,
we assume the Government bears all transaction costs associated with re-
assigning the concession.11 ; 12 On top of these transaction costs, the Govern-
ment also faces costs from disruption to road-users during the transition and
associated political costs.13 Indeed, the international evidence suggests that
9In practice, nancing arrangements are often revealed as part of a PPP tender. If so,
borrowing must be consistent with the cost type imputed from the toll bid. A rm that
wishes to deviate from the equilibrium bid function must tailor its nancing to the implied
construction cost, rather than the actual cost. As we show below, a rms debt is based
on its toll bid and does not depend on its construction cost directly (the latter only a¤ects
Ki). Hence, a rm that deviates from equilibrium will have the incentive to borrow as
if it really were the type it is pretending to be. However, it may need to demonstrate a
cash facility that is greater (if it bids above the equilibrium toll) or lower (if it bids below
the equilibrium toll) than it will actually need. In the latter case, the rms owners will
simply raise more cash ex post if it wins the auction. The former case is more problematic,
as the excess cash becomes liable to seizure by creditors if the rm defaults on its loan.
This will act as an extra disincentive to bid above the equilibrium toll the rms payo¤
function will be kinked at its equilibrium toll, with the binding constraint being the one
that prevents the rm from reducing its bid below the equilibrium toll rate. We plan to
explore these extensions to the model in future work.
10Note that ~b (c; L) depends on c only through ~p (c) so solvency is observable to the
bank and the Government.
11The main point of the paper requires only that the Government face some positive
cost of re-assigning the concession. This is what creates the potential for hold-up by the
concessionaire. The hold-up potential would still exist even if the creditors bear part of
the bankruptcy costs. However, as noted above, this would complicate the analysis by
raising the cost of debt nancing relative to cash.
12Alternatively, the government could allow the concessionaire to increase the toll. This
would result in similar qualitative results although we would need to take into account the
reduction in demand (for a given realisation of the state of nature) that would follow the
increase in toll.
13Dahdal (2010) argues that the failure of the cross-city tunnel in Sydney was of one
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renegotiation is more prevalent than outright failure. For example, Guasch
(2004) found that 55 per cent of Latin American transport concessions from
his 1985-2000 dataset were renegotiated. Similarly, 76 per cent of the Latin
American contracts in the water and sanitation industry studied by Guasch
and Straub (2009) were subject to renegotiation. These considerations sup-
port the view that governments prefer to renegotiate than to replace the
concessionaire.
We therefore assume that the Government places value T 2 (0; c) on
keeping the current concession-holder in place. This assumption is similar to
that Spiegel and Spulber (1994) where a regulator faces an exogenous cost if
the regulated rm is allowed to go bankrupt.
Thus, if demand turns out to be low and
0 < Di   ~b (ci; L)  T ,
the Government and the concessionaire have an incentive to renegotiate.
Under this renegotiation, the Government pays
Di   ~b (ci; L)
to clear the rms debts (thereby validating our assumption that the rm
borrows at the risk-free rate) plus an additional transfer t  0. This gives
surplus
T  

Di   ~b (ci; L)

  t
to the Government and surplus t to the rm. The Nash bargaining solution
for t is
t = 
h
T  

Di   ~b (ci; L)
i
,
where  is the rms bargaining strength.
The rm therefore anticipates payo¤

h
T  

Di   ~b (ci; L)
i
 Ki = 
h
T + ~b (ci; L)
i
+ (1  )Di   ci (1)
in state L. In state H there is no default (by assumption), so the rms
payo¤ is ~b (ci; H)   ci. Since the rms expected payo¤ is therefore strictly
of the most politically damaging issues undermining the credibility of the government:
Issues such as competence, value for money, putting the interests of private contracting
parties ahead of the public have all fed into an image of an out of touch and commercially
incompetent government  even if in reality such a negative reputation is not entirely
warranted. The state government took several measures to boost the concessionaires
revenues (e.g., restricting tra¢ c in areas adjacent to the tunnel) in an attempt to avoid
its bankruptcy.
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increasing in Di, it will maximise its leverage subject to the constraint
0  Di   ~b (ci; L)  min
n
T ; ci   ~b (ci; L)
o
.
This constraint is necessary to ensure that default is a credible threat (the
rst inequality), that the Government is willing to renegotiate (Di ~b (ci; L) 
T ) and that the rm does not borrow more than it needs (Di  ci). The
following assumption ensures that the latter constraint is never binding.
Assumption 0. The Government is never willing to bail out a rm that is
100% debt nanced: T < c  ~b (c; L) for all c 2 [c; c].
Note that this assumption refers to the equilibrium bidding function, so
can only be veried once we have computed the equilibrium bidding function.
However, is clear that it will be satised provided T < c and L is su¢ ciently
low, since ~b (c; L)! 0 as L ! 0.
Under Assumption 0, the rm chooses
Di = ~b (ci; L) + T
and receives payo¤ ~b (ci; L) + T   ci < 0 in state L. Each rm will choose
to be strategically leveraged in order to hold up the Government in the
low demand state if the rm wins the bid. Its debt will be set at a level such
that all of T is required to clear its debts when  = L (given its bid). If
debt were higher than this the Government would not bail out the rm. If
debt were lower, the Government would implicitly secure the debt, but the
rm could only negotiate for fraction  of the residual T  
h
Di   ~b (ci; L)
i
.
Firms use debt to extort all of T in state L and thereby partially insure
themselves against losses when demand is low, courtesy of the tax-payer.
Next, we analyse the bidding strategies. Assume that ~p is di¤erentiable
and strictly increasing. These assumptions will be veried ex post.
If rm i bids ~p (c), it will borrow ~b (c; L) + T and receive equilibrium
payo¤
~b
 
c; 
   ci + (1  )T
conditional on winning the auction. Letting
~ (c) = ~b
 
c; 

+ (1  )T ,
ci must solve
max
c2[c;c]
h
~ (c)  ci
i
F
n 1
(c) .
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Provided ~
0
> 0, it follows by standard arguments that
~ (c) =
Z c
c
z
dH (z)
[1 H (c)] = E [X j X > c] .
Clearly ~
0
> 0 as assumed. We therefore deduce that
~b
 
c; 

= E [X j X > c]   (1  )T
for all c 2 [c; c]. In other words, rms bid more aggressively (demand lower
expected toll revenue) than they would under cash nancing due to their
ability to hold-up the Government and partially o¤set their losses in state
L.
We may again nd an explicit functional form for ~p (c) by solving
p
 
   p =   (c)
where
  (c) = E [X j X > c]   (1  )T .
Thus
~p (c) =

2
 
s

2
2
    (c).
Note that ~p is di¤erentiable and strictly increasing, as we assumed. Assuming
  (c)  0, the construction of the equilibrium bidding function is illustrated
in Figure 2.
The potential to hold-up the Government makes rms bid more aggres-
sively than in the model with cash nancing  compare Figures 1 and 2.
Debt is used strategically to extort transfer T from the Government in the
low demand state. Less e¢ cient rms will be more highly leveraged, since
~b (c; L) is increasing in c, but the equilibrium bidding function is strictly
increasing, so the auction allocates to the most e¢ cient rm.14
This simple two-state model is useful for illustrating the hold-up problem
faced by the Government, but delivers implausibly stark predictions. The
winning rm always threatens default in state L and always obtains a bail-
out of exactly $T from the Government. Moreover, all rms borrow at the
risk-free rate and a rms equilibrium level of debt is independent of  and
H .
14We assumed in this analysis that rms are solvent in the high demand state. It is
conceivable that some bidders may prefer a higher level of debt, so that they are bailed
out in state H and bankrupt in state L, which will therefore alter bidding behaviour.
We will allow for this possibility in the analysis of the continuous state space model.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium with optimal leverage
A more realistic scenario emerges if we allow  to take on a continuum of
values. In this case, di¤erent types will renegotiate in di¤erent contingencies.
Firm i will set its debt equal to ~b (ci; ) + T for some state , but this  may
depend on i. In states that are worse than , rm i will declare bankruptcy
and the Government will not o¤er a bailout, while in states better than 
the rm will either pay its debts or else renegotiate for the Government to
pay them plus an additional transfer. If there is a non-zero probability of
bankruptcy, debt servicing costs will rise above the risk-free rate.
Given its construction costs, each rm decides on its optimal bid and its
optimal level of debt, which in turn determine the contingencies in which it
is bankrupt and in which it renegotiates. These contingencies may depend
on the rms cost type. The nature of this dependence is not obvious a
priori. In the next section, we explore it further by analysing a model with
a continuum of states.
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3 A continuum of states
Suppose now that  is distributed on [L; H ] according to the di¤erentiable
and strictly increasing distribution function G, with G0 = g. Let
 =
Z H
L
 dG () .
We continue to assume H  2L so that equilibrium tolls do not exhaust
demand in any state. In particular, no rm will rationally bid more than
H=2.
3.1 Optimal leverage
If rm i plans to bid p, it will choose an associated nancial structure which
maximises its expected payo¤ contingent on winning the auction. Suppose
it sets its debt level at D 2 [0; ci]. Then its expected prot contingent on
being the winning bidder is
  (ci  D) +
Z
0(p;D)
[p (   p)  [1 + r (p;D)]D] dG ()
+
Z
1(p;D)


T + p (   p)  [1 + r (p;D)]D dG ()
where r (p;D) is the interest rate on the rms debt,
0 (p;D) = f 2 [L; H ] j [1 + r (p;D)]D  p (   p)g
is the set of contingencies in which the rm is solvent and
1 (p;D) =

 2 [L; H ]
 0 < [1 + r (p;D)]D   p (   p)  T 	
is the set of contingencies in which the rm holds up the Government. Note
that the optimal level of debt is independent of ci given the bid p, though
the latter will obviously depend on the rms cost type in equilibrium.
If  is such that
[1 + r (p;D)]D   p (   p) > T
,  < [1 + r (p;D)]D + p
2   T
p
the rm declares bankruptcy and receives   (ci  D). These are the only
contingencies in which the bank is not paid in full. This occurs with proba-
bility
G

[1 + r (p;D)]D + p2   T
p

,
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so r (p;D) is the solution (in r) to
D =
(1 + r)D

1 G

(1 + r)D + p2   T
p

+
Z [(1+r)D+p2 T ]=p
L
p (   p) dG () .
Figure 3: Government transfer as a function of 
Given that the bank makesD in expected value, the rms expected prot
is easily calculated as
p
 
   p  ci + (expected payment from the Government).
Therefore, the rm chooses D to maximise its expected transfer payment
from the Government, which isZ
1(p;D)
[[1 + r (p;D)]D   p (   p)]+  T   [[1 + r (p;D)]D   p (   p)] dG ()
=
Z
1(p;D)
T + (1  ) [[1 + r (p;D)]D   p (   p)] dG () (2)
16
That is, for each state  2 1 (p;D) the Government pays the amount needed
to clear the rms debts, plus an additional transfer of

 
T   [[1 + r (p;D)]D   p (   p)]
which is determined by the bargaining power of the rm.
Figure 3 illustrates the optimisation problem of the rm. It plots the
integrand in (2) as a function of the demand state. Note that this integrand is
linear in  and varies between T and T as  varies over the range 1 (p;D).
We also observe from the integrand in (2) that the slope of the transfer
function is   (1  ) p when  2 1 (p;D). Hence, the length of the interval
1 (p;D) is T=p.
The rm chooses D to maximise the expected value of the transfer func-
tion in Figure 3. Varying D will shift the interval 1 (p;D) but will not alter
its length. We may therefore characterise the rms decision as the optimal
choice of the left-hand end point for 1, denoted by z in Figure 4. Given the
choice of z, the implied choice for D is found by solving
[1 + r (p;D)]D   p (z   p) = T (3)
In other words, we may think of the rm choosing the state ( = z) in which
all of T is needed to clear its debts. This is the lowest demand state in which
it will be bailed out by the Government. If  < z the rm goes bankrupt as
it is too expensive to bail out. If
z <  < z +
T
p
the rm is insolvent but the gap between its toll revenue and (1 + r)D is
less than T . The rm acquires fraction  of this di¤erence through the
renegotiation process. If   z +  T=p, the rm is solvent.
Therefore, rather than choosing D to maximise (2), we can think of the
rm choosing z 2 [L; H ] to maximiseZ minfz+(T=p);Hg
z

T   (1  ) p (   z) dG () (4)
as illustrated in Figure 4.15 If z +
 
T=p

> H then debt repayments exceed
15There is one additional constraint on the choice of z:
z  p+ (1 + r) ci   T
p
.
This ensures that D  ci. It is analogous to Assumption 0 from the two-state model. It
needs to be checked after computing the equilibrium bidding function. For the uniform
case solved below, this constraint will be satised provided L is low enough (as for the
two-state model).
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Figure 4: Optimal choice of z
revenue in every state. We assume that banks are still willing to lend in
anticipation of the additional contribution from Government.
As in the two-state case, the rms optimal leverage depends on its cost
type only through its bid this is clear from Figure 4 and (3). Note that
a lower value of p increases the expected transfer from Government for any
z 2 [L; H). This follows from the fact that decreasing the value of p will
weakly increase the Government transfer at every  see Figure 5. It follows
that the higher a rm bids in the auction, the lower its expected transfer
from the Government (conditional on winning).16 Thus, if the equilibrium
bid function is strictly increasing, more e¢ cient rms extort higher expected
transfers from the public purse. We will shortly verify that the symmetric
equilibrium bid function is indeed strictly increasing when  is uniformly
distributed. In this case, observing large bail-outs is not evidence that the
PPP auction failed to select an e¢ cient provider. Indeed, it is evidence of
the opposite.
The intuition for this result that rms who bid lower expect a higher
payment from the Government  is also discernible from Figure 5. Firms
16This can also be established by applying the Envelope Theorem to (4).
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Figure 5: E¤ect on the transfer from reducing the toll (p0 < p), for xed z
choose their capital structure by choosing a state (z) in which all of T is
needed to clear their debts. For states  2  z; z +  T=p, revenue is higher
so not all of T is required for debt repayment. The rm can only obtain frac-
tion  of the remainder through bargaining. Once revenue is high enough
to repay all debt, the rms claims on the Government vanish. Thus, the
expected payment that the rm can obtain depends on how quickly revenue
rises with . The faster revenue increases with the state, the lower the ex-
pected transfer to the rm. For our demand structure, lower prices reduce
the rate at which revenue increases with  (see Figure 6).
From the geometry of Figure 4 it is clear that a rm which aims to
maximise its payment from the Government would choose p = 0 so that toll
revenue is the same in each state (i.e., zero). This rm would borrow exactly
T so that it is bailed out in every state (hence it pays the risk-free rate of
interest) and extracts T with probability one.17 Choosing p = 0 would also
maximise the rms chances of winning the auction. However, it cannot be
an equilibrium for all rms to bid p = 0, since we assumed that T < c so
17The rm e¤ectively sets z = L.
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the winning rm would make a loss with certainty.18 There is a trade-o¤
between maximising revenue from hold-up and maximising toll revenue, and
the appropriate balance must be struck at a strictly positive toll. However,
since the hold-up incentive reinforces the incentive to set p low to win the
auction, we expect more aggressive bidding than in the absence of strategic
leverage (i.e., when T = 0).
In summary, given its toll bid p, the winning rm chooses its debt level
D to maximise the expected transfer from Government. In choosing its bid,
the rm trades o¤ three e¤ects: the probability of winning, the toll revenue
and the (D-maximised) Government transfer. This contrasts with the more
familiar two-way trade-o¤ between the probability of winning and the toll
revenue when bids are cash nanced. It also leads naturally to the following
typology of equilibria: low tollequilibria in which all types bid so low that
renegotiation is certain and all prot is from transfers, high tollequilibria in
which all types are solvent with positive probability, and mixed equilibria
in which some (high cost) types derive all prot from negotiated transfers
and other (low cost) types have two sources of expected revenue: tolls and
transfers. Note that a low tollequilibrium can only arise if  > 0, otherwise
the Government transfer is just enough to pay debt in every bail-out state
and the rm earns zero prot.
We also observe that the e¤ect of p on transfer revenue is not smooth,
creating the potential for a non-di¤erentiability in the equilibrium bidding
function for mixed equilibria. The derivative of the expected transfer with
respect to p will change discontinuously at the p value satisfying
z +
T
p
= H , p = T
H   z .
At this p value, the expected transfer will rise more slowly as p falls than it
falls as p rises: see Figure 5.19
18Even without this assumption, the rm could make no more than zero prot from
such a strategy. It would receive T from the Government in every state and this would be
just enough to cover its debts.
19The rst-order condition for a local maximum of (4) is
(1  ) p

G

min

z +
T
p
; H

 G (z)

  Tg (z)
+ I

z +
T
p
< H
  
T

g

z +
T
p

= 0 (5)
or else
(1  ) p [G (H) G (z)] 2

Tg (z)   T  gz + T
p

; T g (z)

(6)
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It remains to determine the optimal choice of z for each p > 0 and hence
to determine the equilibrium bidding function. To keep the analysis as simple
as possible, we consider a special case of our model.
Figure 6: Revenue increase ( ! 0) versus toll
3.2 The uniform case
Suppose that  is uniformly distributed on [L; H ]. For this case, it is easy
to compute the optimal debt level for each bid p.
Lemma 1 Let p > 0 be given. If  is uniformly distributed, then it is
optimal for the rm to choose z = L.
Proof It is evident from Figure 4 that the rm is indi¤erent about which
z 2 L; H    T=p to choose.20 If H    T=p < L then the rm
strictly prefers to set z = L. It is therefore without loss of generality
to suppose that all rms choose z = L.
where I [] is an indicator function that takes value one if the specied condition holds and
zero otherwise. Condition (6) is the FOC for a maximum at the kinkin (4).
20Assuming that p  L.
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It follows that creditors are exposed to zero default risk, so r = 0 and
debt satises
D = T + p (L   p) .
Note that rms which bid higher toll rates have a (weakly) lower probability
of receiving a Government bail-out,21 as well as a lower expected payment
from the Government.
A rm that bids p (and chooses its debt level optimally) receives an
expected payment from the Government equal to
T   1
2
(1  ) minT ; p (H   L)	min T
p (H   L) ; 1

=
8><>:
(1+)T
2
2p(H L) if T < p (H   L)
T   1
2
(1  ) p (H   L) if T  p (H   L)
(7)
Next, we characterise equilibrium behaviour. Given the non-di¤erentiability
in (7), we must be careful about assuming di¤erentiability of the equilibrium
bidding function. There are two cases in which di¤erentiability is plausi-
ble: (i) in a low toll equilibrium where bids are strictly increasing in c and
bounded above by T= (H   L), and (ii) in a high toll equilibrium where
bids are strictly increasing in c and bounded below by T= (H   L).
3.2.1 A low toll equilibrium
Note that in a low toll equilibrium all of the winning rms prot is obtained
from exploiting the hold-up problem. If no type bids above T= (H   L),
then the winning bidder is bailed out in every state.
Suppose that p^ is a di¤erentiable and strictly increasing equilibrium bid-
ding function, with p^ (c)  T= (H   L). Let
b^ (c; ) = p^ (c) (   p^ (c)) .
If rm i bids p^ (c) and chooses its debt level optimally, its expected payo¤
(conditional on winning the auction) will be
b^
 
c; 
   ci + T   1
2
(1  ) p^ (c) (H   L) .
We therefore dene
^ (c) = b^
 
c; 

+ T   1
2
(1  ) p (H   L)
21Hence a (weakly) higher probability of solvency.
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Figure 7: Low toll equilibrium with uniform  distribution
such that, for an e¢ cient bidding mechanism, ci solves
max
c2[c;c]
h
^ (c)  ci
i
F
n 1
(c) .
By a similar argument to that used previously, we deduce ^ (c) = E [X j X > c]
and hence
b^
 
c; 

= E [X j X > c]   T + 1
2
(1  ) p^ (c) (H   L)
for all c 2 [c; c].
To nd p^ (c), it is necessary to solve
p
 
   p+ T   1
2
(1  ) p (H   L) =  (c)
, p

^   p

=  (c)  T (8)
where ^ = ^H + (1  ^) L and
^ =    1
2
(1  ) .
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We can solve (8) provided ^  0 and 
^
2
!2
 c  T (9)
(i.e., ^  2
p
c  T ) see Figure 7. The solution is valid provided
p^ (c)  T
(H   L) (10)
(the low toll condition). From Figure 7 we see that conditions (9) and
(10) will be met, for a given value of T= (H   L), provided c  T and ^ are
su¢ ciently low. The latter requires that L is low,  (H   L) is low or 
is low (i.e., weak demand or weak bargaining power for the concessionaire).
In particular, a low toll can partially o¤set the e¤ects of a weak bargaining
position for the rm recall the discussion of Figure 6.
3.2.2 High toll equilibrium
Let p^ be a di¤erentiable and strictly increasing equilibrium bidding function,
with p^ (c)  T= (H   L). Since no type bids below T= (H   L) and p^ is
strictly increasing, the winning rm is solvent with positive probability. If
rm i bids p^ (c), its expected payo¤ (conditional on winning the auction) is
b^
 
c; 
   ci + (1 + )T 2
2p^ (c) (H   L) .
Note that the presence of a hold-up problem gives stronger incentives to
lower the toll price than in the low-toll equilibrium. Once the toll reaches
T= (H   L), marginal (hold-up) incentives for further toll reductions are
constant at
1
2
(1  ) (H   L) .
Proceeding similarly to the previous section, we have
b^
 
c; 

= E [X j X > c]   (1 + )T
2
2p^ (c) (H   L)
for all c 2 [c; c], with p^ (c) the solution to
p
 
   p+ (1 + )T 2
2p (H   L) =  (c)
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, p  p2   p+  (c) = 2 (H   L)
(1 + )T
2 (11)
The roots of p2   p+  (c) are

2

s

2
2
   (c),
so we have the situation depicted in Figure 8. A local maximum must occur
on a downward sloping portion of the cubic, so the middle of the three in-
tersections in Figure 8 is the only viable candidate for the equilibrium bid of
type c.
Figure 8: High toll equilibrium
Note (Figure 9) that p^ is strictly increasing in c as assumed. It follows
that a high toll equilibrium exists only if the local maximum value of the
cubic
p
 
p2   p+  (c) (12)
is at least
2 (H   L)
(1 + )T
2 ,
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Figure 9: High toll equilibrium (c0 > c)
and p^ (c)  T= (H   L) (the high toll condition). See Figure 10. To
satisfy these conditions, it su¢ ces, for a given value of T= (H   L), to
choose  high enough so that the local maximum of (12) occurs (at or) above
p = T= (H   L), and (1 + )T high enough that
2 (H   L)
(1 + )T
2
is below the value of (12) at its local maximum. That is, we require strong
demand, high returns from hold-up and a strong bargaining position for the
rm.
It should be noted that there is one further necessary condition for equi-
librium existence. The middle solution to (11) must not be dominated by
a price at or below T= (H   L). A bid in the latter range guarantees that
the rm will win the auction (in a high toll equilibrium) and be bailed out
in every state. Thus, we require that
max
pT=(H L)
p

^   p

+ T   c  [ (c)  c]F n 1 (c)
for all c 2 [c; c]. This will be so provided T= (H   L) is su¢ ciently low.
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Figure 10: Existence of high toll equilibrium
3.2.3 Mixed equilibrium
The model with a uniform  distribution also admits equilibria that are mix-
tures of the low tolland the high tollvariety. In these mixedequilibria,
the bidding function is non-di¤erentiable at a toll equal to T= (H   L). It
resembles the low toll equilibrium below this value and the high toll
equilibrium above.
3.3 Summary
Firms choose debt levels strategically in order to hold-up the Government, so
the winning rm will threaten default with positive probability. Under our
demand structure, a rm that bids lower is able to extract a higher expected
bail-out from the Government. Provided the equilibrium bidding function is
strictly increasing, this means that more e¢ cient rms make higher demands
on the public purse (and hence charge very low tolls).
We computed the symmetric equilibrium bid function when  is uniformly
distributed and veried that it is strictly increasing. In this case, rms never
actually go bankrupt, but each rm i credibly threatens default in an interval
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of states of the form [L; 

i ] for some 

i 2 (L; H ]. When i = H rm i
threatens default in all states, so its return on equity comes entirely from
Government transfers. Depending on parameters, we may observe a low
tollequilibrium, in which toll bids are so low that i = H for every rm;
a high toll equilibrium in which i < H for every rm; or a mixed
equilibrium in which more e¢ cient rms are solvent in some states while
less e¢ cient rms threaten default in all states.
Weak demand or weak concessionaire bargaining power encourage low
tollequilibria, while strong demand or strong bargaining power encourage
high tollequilibria. The link between demand and tolls is natural, though
the correlation between bargaining strength and equilibrium toll levels may
seem counter-intuitive. The latter arises because toll reductions are a partial
substitute for bargaining strength. Under our demand structure, lower tolls
allow the rm to credibly threaten bankruptcy in more states and thereby
increase the returns from hold-up.
3.4 Variations and extensions
Let us briey discuss the robustness of these conclusions.
The linear demand structure is not critical. Figure 6 reveals the properties
of demand that drive the result that more e¢ cient winners extract a higher
expected bail-out. The key property is that higher demand states (i.e., higher
values of ) increase the sensitivity of revenue to price increases. Any demand
structure in which the unknown demand parameter has this e¤ect should
produce qualitatively similar features. Since more e¢ cient rms bid lower
tolls, their revenue rises less rapidly with  so they require larger bail-outs
over a larger range of demand states.
Alternative  distributions will obviously change the equilibrium in com-
plex ways. However, one change is easily predicted and is in the direction
of greater realism. With a Uniform distribution for , all rms choose debt
levels such that they are bailed out in the worst demand state (L) none
is allowed to fail. With a non-Uniform distribution especially one with low
density in the neighbourhood of L this is unlikely to be the case. Instead,
rms will face some positive probability of going bankrupt at the optimal
level of debt. Hence they will pay above the risk-free rate on their debt,
and this rate is likely to vary depending on the rms toll bid. Note, how-
ever, that this will not alter the fact that more e¢ cient winners extract a
higher expected bail-out. This is clear from Figure 4. More e¢ cient rms,
who bid lower tolls, can always achieve a higher expected transfer from he
Government.
We have assumed a rst-price auction structure throughout, as this con-
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forms more closely with practice (World Bank, 2008). Nothing of signicance
would change if we assumed a second-price structure but nor would we ob-
tain any signicant simplication. Under a second-price structure each rm
would bid so that its total revenue tolls plus transfers matches its con-
struction cost. But the complicated process of invertingthis total revenue
to obtain the implied toll bid would be the same as in the present analysis.22
There is also another reason to think that Governments might prefer rst-
price auctions. Hansen (1988) showed that these may yield lower expected
supply prices than second-price auctions. His model di¤ers from ours, but
the same conclusion is easily shown, at least for the benchmark case of cash-
nanced bidding. From Figure 1 we see that the toll is a strictly increasing
and convex function of revenue. Let  denote this function. In a rst-price
auction, when a type c rm wins it charges a toll equal to
 (E [X j X > c]) (13)
where X is the random variable corresponding to the lowest of n  1 random
draws from the construction cost distribution F . In a second-price auction,
if type c wins it charges an expected toll equal to
E [ (X) j X > c]
which is higher than (13) by Jensens inequality.
Finally, one might consider introducing a reserve price into the auction.
Of course, rms already bid unrealistically low tolls in anticipation of addi-
tional transfers. A reserve price might still be considered, either to exclude
rms whose implied costs are too high (relative, say, to a public sector com-
parator), or to further reduce the toll charged by the winning rm. However,
the gains from the latter must now be o¤set against the increase in the ex-
pected transfer that will be paid when the toll is reduced. Hold-up is likely
to dull the incentives to use reserve prices to manage procurement costs.
4 Discussion
We have presented a model in which to study the equilibrium nancial struc-
ture and equilibrium bids of rms competing for a PPP contract (highway
concession). Our motivation was to better understand the prevalence of de-
fault and renegotiation in such PPPs. Faced with such evidence, one might
22However, if we were to allow rms to di¤er in maintenance costs as well as (or instead
of) construction costs, then the analysis in Hansen (1988) suggests that a second-price
structure would yield signicant simplication.
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reasonably question whether the PPP auction has awarded the contract to
the most e¢ cient rm (cf, Spulber, 1990; Zheng, 2001). Our results suggest
that there is no reason to question the e¢ ciency of the auction. Bidders use
debt strategically to partially insure against low demand states, by credibly
threatening default and triggering a re-negotiation. Bids are therefore lower
than under unlimited liability, but the contract is still awarded to the most
e¢ cient rm. The most surprising result is that probability and size of the
bail-out is increasing in the e¢ ciency of the winning rm.
These insights complement the existing PPP literature and provide a
theoretical framework to understand the relationship between the PPP ten-
der, high leverage ratios and default in PPP contracts. This relationship is
highlighted, for example, by a recent report published by the Department of
Infrastructure and Transport (2012) that surveys the empirical literature on
PPPs for toll road concessions. The report links overbidding (that is, bids
which appear to over-estimate the value of the contract), and the subsequent
renegotiation or default, to a number of characteristics, including nancial
structuring focused on high leverage and debt maximisation.
Our results then o¤er a number of implications for PPP design. First,
they reinforce doubts about the ability of the Government to e¤ectively trans-
fer risk to the private partner. In this respect, our paper complements the
work of Engel, Fischer and Galetovic (2001, 2008) who propose a novel auc-
tion mechanism to provide better demand-side risk management and to mit-
igate the need to renegotiate contracts. These authors introduce the notion
of a variable term concession implemented through a Least-Present-Value-
of-Revenue (LPVR) auction. Under this mechanism, the auction allocates
the contract to the bidder who bids the lowest present value of expected
revenue. The Government species the toll for each demand state before
bids are taken. The duration of the contract is endogenously determined,
since the contract species that the concession remain in place until the rm
recovers its bid. The LPVR auction thus fully insures the winning bidder,
which ensures e¢ cient risk-sharing, since bidders are risk-averse in the model
of Engel, Fischer and Galetovic. Bids then simply reect construction cost.
Engel, Fischer and Galetovic (EFG) assume that is possible to nd a
mechanism that avoids further renegotiation by fully transferring the risk of
default to the Government. In the absence of commitment, the Government
must ensure non-negative PVR in every state, not just in expectation. The
Government e¤ectively renegotiates in advance: setting the toll and conces-
sion duration as a function of the state, so there is no need to re-negotiate
ex post.
Thus, EFG consider a more complete contract than in our model. We
assume that it is politically infeasible for Governments to commit to transfers
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or toll increases in advance. Since most highway concessions have in fact been
allocated on the basis of very incomplete contracts bids are typically non-
contingent tolls or concession durations it is important to understand the
properties of such PPP auctions, and the interaction of nancing choices and
renegotiation in the outcomes of such contractual arrangements. The present
paper is a rst step in this direction.
A second implication for PPP design emerging from this paper relates to
the desirability to restrict biddersnancial structure. High equity require-
ments can ameliorate the hold-up problem by forcing debt levels down so
that default is not a credible threat but at the cost of reducing participation
from cash-constrained bidders. Although such restrictions on the nancial
structure of bidders might sound intrusive, there are parallels both in reg-
ulation and taxation. Regulated rms are usually allowed a rate of return
on capital based on a capital structure that is deemed e¢ cient, and which
may vary from the regulated rms actual capital structure. Similarly, there
are thin capitalisation rules that are designed to prevent rms from issuing
too much debt in a particular tax jurisdiction to take advantage of the tax
deductibility of interest.
Finally, the analysis above suggests that there might be room for auction
design to mitigate the incentives to choose debt strategically and to minimise
the prevalence of renegotiation. A rst step is to consider auctions in the
LPVR spirit, in which rms bid the present value of revenue and choose the
toll ex post. The analysis of such auctions, with endogenous nancing, are a
useful subject for future research.
References
[1] Bajari, P. and S. Tadelis (2001) Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A
Theory of Procurement ContractsRAND Journal of Economics 32(3),
387-407.
[2] Board, S. (2007) Bidding Into the Red: AModel of Post-Auction Bank-
ruptcyJournal of Finance 62(6), 2695-2723.
[3] Bracey, N. and S. Moldovan (2007) Public Private Partnerships: Risks
to the Public and Private Sector. Paper presented at the 6th Global
Conference on Business and Economics, Boston, Massachusetts.
[4] Dahdal, A. (2010) The Dissolution of Public Private Partnerships: An
Australian Case Study of the Political Costs Involved International
Review of Business Research Papers 6(2), 1-11.
31
[5] Department of Infrastructure and Transport (2012) Disincentivising
Overbidding for Toll Road ConcessionsCanberra ACT, Australia.
[6] Engel, E., R. Fischer and A. Galetovic (2001) Least-Present-Value-of-
Revenue Auction and Highway FranchisingJournal of Political Econ-
omy 109, 993-1020.
[7] Engel, E., R. Fischer and A. Galetovic (2008) The Basic Public Finance
of Public-Private Partnerships Discussion Paper No. 957, Economic
Growth Center, Yale University, New Haven CT, USA (forthcoming in
the Journal of the European Economics Association).
[8] Grossman, S. J. and O. Hart (1986) The Cost and Benets of Owner-
ship: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral IntegrationJournal of Political
Economy 94(4), 691-719.
[9] Guasch, J.-L. (2004) Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Con-
cession: Doing It RightThe World Bank, Washington DC, USA.
[10] Gausch, J. -L. and S. Straub (2009) Corruption and Concession Rene-
gotiations: Evidence from the Water and Transport Sectors in Latin
AmericaUtilities Policy 19(2), 185-190.
[11] Guasch, J.-L., J.-J. La¤ont and S. Straub (2006) Renegotiation of Con-
cession Contracts: A Theoretical ApproachReview of Industrial Orga-
nization 29(1-2), 5573.
[12] Guasch, J.-L., J.-J. La¤ont and S. Straub (2007) Concessions of In-
frastructures in Latin America: Government-Led RenegotiationJour-
nal of Applied Econometrics 22(7), 421-442.
[13] Guasch, J.-L., J.-J. La¤ont and S. Straub (2008) Renegotiation of
Concession Contracts in Latin America: Evidence from the Water and
Transport SectorInternational Journal of Industrial Organization 26,
421-442.
[14] Hansen, R.G. (1988) Auctions with Endogenous Quantity RAND
Journal of Economics 19(1), 44-58.
[15] Iossa, E. and D. Martimort (2008) The Simple Micro-Economics of
Public-Private PartnershipsCEIS: Center for Economic and Interna-
tional Studies working paper number 139, Rome, Italy.
32
[16] Martimort, D., and J. Pouyet (2008) To Build or Not to Build: Norma-
tive and Positive Theories of Public-Private PartnershipsInternational
Journal of Industrial Organization 26, 393-411.
[17] Masten, S. E. and S. Saussier (2000) Econometrics of Contracts: An
Assessment of Developments in the Empirical Literature on Contract-
ingRevue dEconomie Industrielle 92, 215-237.
[18] Menezes, F.M. and P.K. Monteiro (2004) An Introduction to Auction
Theory, OUP: New York.
[19] Rhodes-Kropf, M. and S. Viswanathan (2005) Financing Auction Bids
RAND Journal of Economics 36(4), 789-815.
[20] Spiegel, Y. and D.F. Spulber (1994) The Capital Structure of a Regu-
lated FirmRAND Journal of Economics 25(3), 424-440.
[21] Spiegel, Y. and D.F. Spulber (1997) Capital Structure with Counter-
vailing IncentivesRAND Journal of Economics 28(1), 1-24.
[22] Spulber, D.F. (1990) Auctions and Contract EnforcementJournal of
Law, Economics and Organization 6(2), 325-344.
[23] Thomsen, S. (2005) Encouraging Public-Private Partnerships in the
Utilities Sector: The Role of Development AssistanceOECD/DAF In-
vestment Division.
[24] Williamson, O. E. (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, The
Free Press: New York.
[25] Zheng, C. (2001) High Bids and Broke WinnersJournal of Economic
Theory 100, 129-171.
33
